Ukrainian and Russian Offensive Options

 It's been just over a year since Russia launched its "Special Military Operation" against Ukraine, and what a year it has been. Many mistakes have been made by both sides, and if NATO had not intervened to supply Ukraine with weapons, and just as importantly money, this war would have been over in three months at the most. In particular, shoulder fired anti tank weapons paralyzed the Russian advance, which due to the time of year, was reduced to funneling along road ways which became killing zones. The Russians, having lost the initiative of a quick lightening attack, became overstretched and in a vulnerable position. The Ukrainians took advantage of that by launching their offensive in Lugansk, Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The Russians then had no choice but to with drawl to a defensive posture that its army could defend. That sums up the first year of the war more or less. 

The big question is what are the next battlefield moves. Ukraine is facing some difficult choices in this regard. Although much has been made by Ukrainian and Western propaganda of the successful Ukrainian "counter offensive" (which is the political term for counter-attack") in driving Russian troops back, this is a bit of a stretch. The truth is when Russia failed to capture Mykolaiv, and thereby open the door to Odessa, the only real defensive position they could take was the city of Kherson and the Dnieper River. American exports of Hymars rocket systems to Ukraine, which constantly damaged Russian crossings of the Dnieper, forced Russia to abandon the city of Kherson and establish defensive lines on the opposite side of the Dnieper. Up until that time, Ukrainian troops were suffering defeat after defeat in the fields north of Kherson, so it wasn't Ukrainian offensive tactics that one the day, but rather strategic tactics.

In Kharkov/ Lugansk oblasts it was a similar story. It was not so much a feat of arms that dislodged the Russians from this area - it was overrun because Russian forces were very over stretched and had to withdraw to defensible lines. That brings us to today. The Russian Army is no longer in a position of being overstretched. It has had time to reinforce defensive lines along the front, and increase the size of its forces engaged in the conflict by 300,000 troops (not including Wagner units). Importantly, the Russians have hurriedly upgraded their acquisition and use of drones. This leaves Ukraine with the stark choice of where to conduct an offensive (the much touted "spring counter offensive") as demanded by their Western allies. 

The most talked about, and perhaps obvious choice is an attack along the southern front from Zaporizhzhia, which would aim to capture Melitopol and Mariupol - effectively ending the Russian land route to Crimea. However, that option is also obvious to the Russians, and the area has been heavily fortified and reinforced. The Russians also have the advantage of almost immediate air and naval support from Crimea and area and Rostov-On-Don. While the Ukrainians may try this in an act to appease their backers, should they use massive resources to do so, and lose, their war could be over. Therefore, from a Ukrainian perspective, a large southern assault should be out of the question. Ditto for attacking Crimea in force. That leaves the Donetsk city front, the Bakmut front, or the Russian front as options. 

Both Donetsk and Bakmut fronts are fortified areas that would chew up Ukrainian troops. While a significant attack in Bakhmut, when the ground is dry, may cause the Russians to withdraw, the Ukrainians would be faced with the Severodonetsk area. Built up area after built up area, mostly in ruins. As World War Two showed, cities full of rubble make the job of defence much more easy for the defenders. That leaves the last option - the Russian front.

In the last year Ukraine has shown two traits: embarrass Russia; and try to provoke a greater war in the region. The ideal way to do that would be an invasion of Russia itself - namely Belgorod. Belgorod is a Russian city very close to the Ukrainian border. Not far away from Belgorod is Kharkov, which remains firmly in Ukrainian hands. The Ukrainians can use Kharkov as a strategic supply point for their troops entering Russia and a battle for Belgorod. Undoubtably the Russian military would see such a buildup in Kharkov with their satellites, but what if they decide it also serves their strategic purposes that Ukraine makes such a move. Given that all the other fronts will cost Ukraine massive casualties and loses of equipment, it makes sense to kill a few birds with one stone. No doubt their allies would say "you can't expect Ukraine to fight on its own soil only when it was invaded by a hostile act..." 

On the other side of the fence, Russian military planners have to decide what their next move is. While the intel on Russian forces dispositions is limited to us, we know they called up 300,000 reservists. About 80,000 of those were current enough in their training to join the conflict immediately. Where the other 200,000 plus are is a bit of a mystery. Many channels are suggesting these troops have been going through thorough training with combat veterans. If that is the case, and they have not yet been committed to the fight, Russia has a powerful force for its own spring offensive. However, I doubt this will be the case. 

Russia, unlike Ukraine, has no pressure from its allies to conduct an offensive en masse. It seems quite content to engage, pin and destroy Ukrainian units - namely in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. It uses mainly conscripts in Bakhmut, and thereby destroys Ukrainian units while leaving its regular army in one piece. This is how the Russians do military strategy and they have in every major war they've been involved in. Fewer people at home complain about losses when they are people who were in prison. The same mentality exists in the West, but is rarely acted on as it is in this case. Russia has also learned, you would think, that big offenses that stretch your troops too thin bring drastic consequences. 

To avoid these consequences I believe Russia will stand pat until after the Ukrainians commit their troops in an offensive. Once the Russians have defeated the Ukrainian offensive they will go on the counter-attack. That is likely the time that the 200,000 troops in training will be committed, but to where?

Given that the Russian Army is currently trying to take Bakhmut many speculate that Kramatorsk and Slavyansk will be next. However, both cities are heavily fortified and would prove to be worse than Bakhmut in terms of manpower/equipment necessary, time and casualties. It makes more sense that the Russians would head south from Bakhmut, through Kostyantynivka and onto Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is a hub city like Bakhmut, and capturing it would cut off Ukrainian troops entrenched around the city of Donetsk. The Russians are currently fighting in, and have captured most of Marinka. Once Marinka is captured the Russians could move along the road to Kurakove. Once Kurakove is captured the Ukrainian Army in Donetsk city area will be fully surrounded in what the Russians like to call a "boiler". Cut off from resupply, and unable to retreat, the enveloped Ukrainians will have no choice but to surrender. This seems like a logical path for a Russian offensive. 

Whatever the case may be in the coming months, look for the Ukrainian Army to make the first move, and Russia to take the advantage in response.