Are Putin's Days Numbered?

 Are Putin's Days Numbered?

Russia has been at limited war with Ukraine for over 4 years. There is no end in sight. Why? The answer to that question sits squarely on the President of Russia's shoulders. 

In 2015, separatist forces, backed by Russian direct military support, encircled what was left of Ukraine's best military units in the Battle of Debatsevo, Donbass. At that exact moment in time Russia had a choice to make: chase the battered remnants of the Ukrainian Army out of the rest of Donestk and Lugansk Oblasts; or cease the pursuit and make peace. Despite warnings from "The Rifleman", the famous commander of separatist forces in the Donetsk Oblast { allegedly also a senior Russian intelligence officer}, that failing to pursue the Ukrainians would lead to the Russians facing a far more built up Ukrainian Army in a near certain future conflict, Putin chose to withdraw support for any further advance. He famously harkened on the shared brotherhood of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and advocated that peace could be found in constitutional amendments that granted the peoples of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts rights to autonomy within Ukraine. This was Putin's first and most egregious mistake of this war.

His second mistake was to agree to the first Minsk Accord, and then the Second a year later. Both were obviously designed to give Ukraine time to rebuild its military, and fortify regions of the Donbass it still controlled. This was later admitted to by former German Angela Merkel, but it was obvious to any person schooled in the art of diplomacy and war. Putin would obviously fit that title.

The obvious became the evident when in February, 2022 Russia was forced to commit to a "Special Military Operation" to defend the newly created "Republics" of Donetsk and Lugansk. The Ukrainian Army had deployed its newly created, NATO funded and trained, army to the borders of Donetsk and Lugansk, and from all appearances the Ukrainians were ready to take back the territories. Putin chose to boldly confront NATO over this, and chose to lay the real gauntlet down. Russia, he said, was no longer prepared to be pushed around by NATO, and its never ending eastern expansion toward Russia's borders. He demanded a new treaty that rolled back NATO's presence and influence along Russia's borders, or he would defend them by force. It appeared at the time that Putin was reasserting Russia's deterrence. A bold move, and a necessary one given the disrespecting of Russia's core national interests by NATO.

The problem with Putin's stand was that he was apparently bluffing. After NATO refused to respect, or even acknowledge Russia's strategic concerns, Putin ordered the Russian military to invade Ukraine. This is mistake number three. Putin ordered the Russian Army into combat at the end of February. A time when the ground was still hard enough to support tanks and mechanized vehicles. However, as every Russian knows, its isn't long after that when those same fields turn to mud and stop armored movement. Parts of the Russian Army became bogged down in mud, while tanks that took to the roads were ambushed by US supplied shoulder fired antitank missiles. The portion of the Russian army that entered from Belarus made better progress and soon occupied neighboring communities of Kiev. The situation looked desperate for Ukraine, and its bargaining position was at an all time low. 

Then Putin makes his 4th bad decision. He again reverts back to the "brotherly peoples" story and in Ankara, Turkey he comes to an agreement with Ukrainian President Zelensky to end the Special Military Operation. Taking a quick and relatively easy way out of the invasion appealed to Putin's "low cost" strategy of war and diplomacy. Without anything being required of the Ukrainians to prove good faith, he volunteered a Russian Army withdrawal from Kiev and the territory to its north. No sooner had the Russians completed this show of good faith, the Ukrainians denied there was ever a deal and continued the war. 

The proof is clear. Putin's conduct of diplomacy and warfare was a near complete failure by 2022. However, in many ways, his failures since then have been even worse. Putin, it appeared, was all bluff. The US and NATO began calling Russia a "paper tiger". A toothless old beast. A relic of history. They called the Russian Army weak given the months and sometimes years it took them to take a single city- let alone having to withdraw from Kherson because they could not keep it supplied. In the beginning of the war US President Biden claimed he could not supply Ukraine with fighter jets, because he didn't want to start World War 3. Two years later all of NATO was supplying Ukraine with fighter jets. What did Putin do? Nothing. He huffed and he puffed, but did nothing. Ditto for tanks and artillery. Ditto for long range and cruise missiles. Nothing.

Sweden and Finland became so emboldened by Russia's nonresponse that hey joined NATO without fear for the consequences. The EU and NATO publicly acknowledged the funding of Ukraine's war that was and is killing thousands of Russians. What did Putin do? Nothing. He threatened, but each time that threat was empty. It was never carried out. Russia's power as a deterrent to stabilize competing forces in the world was crushed. US President Trump decided it was a good time for him to feed on the bones of Russia's sphere of influence. Moldova was overtaken by the EU. Georgia nearly repeated that fate. Armenia decided to ally itself separately from Russia, and closer to NATO. The Syrian government was overthrown. The Venezuela government was decapitated. Iran was attacked by the US, which remains the case today. The Cuban government has been threatened with invasion. It all comes back to the doorsteps of one man - Putin.

His poor judgement and appreciation of the situation has cost Russia dearly. The war that he constantly tried to avoid by appeasement has resulted in a long proxy war that has cost untold amount of Russian lives, and resources. It has cornered both Russia and China, and undermined the economic community of BRICS. In short, it has diminished the reputation that Russia not too long ago enjoyed of being the great nation that defeated Nazi Germany. Even today, simple steps could be taken to end the war in Ukraine quickly in Russia's favor. For example: Only a handful of bridges span the Dnieper River that connects Eastern and Western Ukraine. Destroying these bridges would halt almost all supply of weapons and resources from NATO to Ukrainian Army formations fighting in Eastern Ukraine. This could have happened at any time in the last 4 years. It would have saved hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of lives. Many of those Russian. Putin failed to order this. In effect, he has prolonged the war and emboldened Russia's enemies by his failure to do what is obvious and necessary.

I once admired Russian President as a statesman. His ability to stabilize and grow Russia was impressive. However, it appears he forgot his own history. Afterall, it was the failure to put down the Chechen revolt that helped bring him into power as the strong man Russians love, and it was his ruthless pursuit of the second Chechen War that cemented him in the hearts of Russians. He now appears to be like the ineffective leader who oversaw the Chechens defeat the Russian Army, and no longer the strong man who acted to succeed. Is it any wonder why Putin's days could be numbered?

Operation Guillotine - The Coming Russian Counterattack

 

Lessons of war: every war is different, yet the basics remain the same - isolate and destroy. There is a hard way and their is an easier way to defeat your opponent. There is the art of war, and their is the wall of reality. The Ukrainians have shown more creativity and initiative in the art of war - likely through the eyes of their backers. The Russians started the war with a lot of imagination and initiative, but hit the wall of reality that splitting your forces is the best way to have them devoured - the wall of reality. They were forced to recoil, and the Ukrainians simply followed their retreat out of Kherson, Sumy, Kiev, and Kharkov Oblasts. The Ukrainian advance stooped just west of the Oskil River when Russian contraction allowed them to solidify defensive lines. The Ukrainians then made several ill-advised offensives for the flanks of the destroyed city of Bakhmut, which unnecessarily ate man power, resources, and time. They are currently attempting to capture Tokmak as a gateway to the Azoz Sea coast - which is mired in failure. The time may be ripe for a massive Russian offensive to decisively end the war. 

LESSIONS OF WAR

One of the biggest lessons of this war has been flanking major concentrations of enemy troops without sufficient distance between the parties is a recipe for loss. Loss can be in momentum, in troops, in equipment, in morale and in time - all enemies of a successful military campaign. We have witnessed this from both sides in this war. Whether its the endless Russian quagmires of Avdiivka and Marinka, or the Ukrainian quagmires of Bakhmut and Zaporizhia. Limiting    yourself to a flanking that exposes your forces to the maximum range effect of the enemies        artillery support, and mining, guarantees that your efforts will result in stalemate at best. This    has become the reoccurring theme of the Ukrainian War. So lesson one is flanking pincers must bypass major troop concentrations - not engage them. That's Blitzkrieg 101. The strategic aim to cut off supply to the enemy BEFORE engaging them in an attrition battle.

Lesson number two: piecemealing forces is a recipe for disaster. We witnessed the Russians commit this terrible strategy when they invaded Ukraine. It ended up in a loss of: momentum; troops; equipment, morale and time. The Ukrainians were able to survive and rebuild. What has happened since is piecemeal attacks by both sides, with the exceptions of Bakhmut and Mariupol, which have resulted in mass casualties with no significant progress - near stalemate in other words. Wars are not won on offensives conducted by battalion or less groups, yet that is what has been happening along almost all parts of the front by both sides - resulting in nothing but casualties and losses in equipment. 

Lesson three: concentrated, long range attacks against strategically imperative targets are highly effective. The Ukrainians essentially made the Russian positions in Kherson Oblast untenable when they rendered the Kherson bridge unusable. The Russians have been terrible at this - for  some reason. For example there are only two Ukrainian rail bridges crossing the Dnieper River: the Amursky Bridge in Dnipro; and the Petrivskiy Bridge in Kiev. Both those bridges still stand and allow Ukraine to transfer Western arms and ammunition to its forces in the most efficient  way possible, rail, given the size of the country. The hydro dam bridges that dot the Dnieper remain untouched - ditto for the car bridges. This one lesson appears to be completely lost on the Russian leadership, and has been a major strategic mistake harming Russian forces on a daily basis.

Lesson four: minefields stop troops and equipment from moving - Zaporiozhia for example. They can be used in an offensive or defensive posture. They can stop troops from advancing, and they can stop troops from retreating. Essentially, Russian mobile mine-laying units, like the modern ISDM Zemledelive, can be paired with armored formations to fix enemy flanking forces in place while bypassing them to greater depths. In a Blitzkrieg-like offensive, the ability to instantly trap the enemy in strongholds while on the move opens the doors to large advances. It is a combined-arms operation that hasn't been utilized well by the Russians. 

Frankly, the lessons of this war could be covered in a very thick book, and a simple blog can hardly cover it all. The bottom-line is the Russians are about to initiate a very large offensive of their own, and the only question is where and how. 

OPERATION GUILLOTINE

PHASE ONE

Given the lesson the Ukrainians taught the Russians in Kherson, which the Russians should have foreseen, any coming offensive must first sever the artery of supply. Without food, ammunition, and fuel a modern army cannot survive for more than weeks, so cutting supply is the first priority. To that end the Russians must first conduct a massive airstrike on Ukraine's most capable air defences - the German and American AD. Simultaneously, the Russians must destroy the railway bridges over the Dnieper so that Ukraine can no longer supply its forces with mass railway movements - that's two bridges. With major air defences destroyed, Russian strategic bombers focus on destroying Ukrainian artillery regiments in the Sumy/Kharhov regions. 

PHASE TWO

Russian airborne forces conduct mass drops along the river just west of Poltava. Their objective is to secure the river crossing (no bridges needed) for the coming armored and mechanized infantry forces that will surround Poltava and move on to Kremenchuk  and Dnipro. The Russian Army will use two centres for the start of their operation: Kursk and Belgorod. The Kursk group will flank the city of Sumy at a distance, isolating it as it goes with mobile mining, and proceed to the crossing points the airborne have secured. They will then isolate Poltava in the same fashion as Sumy, and proceed to the Dnieper. The second grouping, from Belgorod, will also flank Kharkov at distance, isolating it in the same fashion with mobile mining, then move to the eastern part of Poltava, isolating it, and meeting up with the Kursk grouping at Dnipro. It is critical that the route of the advance is not too narrow, avoids rivers requiring bridges, and is open enough for armored/mechanized warfare. No forests, no rivers, no cities and as few tree lines as possible.

PHASE THREE

Having secured its positions in Phase Two, the Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine will be trapped and without supply. The Ukrainian forces in these areas will have no choice but to surrender. They won't do so immediately, but the plight of the troops and the fury in Kiev will likely force the Ukrainian military/government's hand. A show of successful force in a decisive manner, will likely quiet the war drums beating in places like Poland, etc. However, even if this offensive succeeds, and it does not quiet the warmongers, it will leave Russia in the position of controlling all of Eastern Ukraine, and opens the doorway to Odessa. Time will tell what path the Russian military/government choose, but whatever they choose must incorporate the lessons of this war, otherwise the fingers must be pointed inward.