There are no good options within the Liberal Party in this province. That is the basic truth. Now that is becoming more and more obvious by the day. Newfoundland and Labrador was sick and tired of the secrecy and shady dealings of the PC Party, and in the last election the people turned to the Liberals to put an end to that kind of politics. Just like the Liberal leadership process that saw a lackluster, even boring, Dwight Ball selected as the party leader, so the electorate settled for a lackluster but seemingly less dangerous option when they voted in the Liberals. Surely the Liberal would have gotten the message that the sleazy, corrupt, secret type of politics practised by the PCs would no longer be accepted here. Now, it is very obvious they didn't get the memo.
The truth is that behind the scenes within the Liberal Party powerful elements of the old guard and backroom boys were not supporting Dwight Ball as leader, but rather their sweetheart was Cathy Bennett. In fact, she was not even considered a Liberal until she threw her name in the race claiming to have always been there, and that her "coming out of the closet" was simply a coincidence as it coincided with the leadership race. A strange place to be for a woman who wrote cheques every year to the PC Party, and not the Liberals. An odd place for a woman running in a party that was at that time anti-Muskrat Falls considering her Chairmanship of the Board of Nalcor Energy. The woman who hired Nancy O'Connor to come to Newfoundland from Nova Scotia to set up the pro-business lobby group for Muskrat Falls - including paying for the websites etc of that group.
As Bennett money poured into her leadership campaign instant Bennett fans started appearing out of the wood work. Many "young Liberals" suddenly appeared lobbying for her on social media, and organizing for her on the ground. Yes, the darling of the likes of Danny Williams was about to take the party by storm. Just one problem: older Liberals didn't trust her. They didn't accept her pro-Muskrat Falls business position. So despite her money, Bennett lost to the compromise candidate Dwight Ball. Bennett and her powerful friends in the business community weren't prepared to accept that, and a covert movement began to overthrow Ball from the leadership. They had a problem though. The election was too close at hand, so the plan was scheduled for once the Liberals were in power - sort of. In reality Bennett and her minions became very involved in district association nomination meetings trying to get pro-Bennett/business types in as Liberal candidates and thus Liberal MHAs.
I was approached myself by such a person a month and a half before the election, and during a nomination race in one district. This old time Liberal had a serious issue in over throwing a Liberal candidate who had managed to get nominated, but wasn't marching to Bennett's pro-fracking band wagon. A local wealthy businessman was putting up the funds to beat the candidate during the election. As part of their approach to me the person emphasized that Bennett was going to take over the leadership after the election. That she had all the cards already in place. He also mentioned that Paul Antle and Siobhan Coady may be involved as well. If this person hadn't been a long time Liberal with deep roots I may have dismissed it out of hand, However, they were. They also had invested in shares of Shoal Point and the goal was to get Bennett in so that fracking would be approved in the province, and of course those shares would become very valuable. So, as you can see, the sleaze and secrecy was oozing from the seams of the Liberal Party even before the election had officially begun.
Fast forward to today, and it becomes even more obvious - albeit much more public. Ball struck a deal for Martin to leave Nalcor, and put in place Stan Marshall. Marshall's plan will be to privatise NL Hydro - which includes the 65% of CFLCo that NL Hydro owns (and that also necessarily means the Upper Churchill which CFLCo owns). Bennett and her St. John's business boys are all for selling it too, but they want it to go to Emera. That's what the big business boys bet on, and that's what they want. Those are the dividing lines within the Liberal Party today. I say Liberal Party, but it's more like the Chameleon Party - elements of the old Liberal party controlled by the boys and girls of the St. John's business community that are suddenly Liberals having just been PCs.
In any case, that is the war. Not whether or not to sell NL Hydro, but to who. The peoples' interest in all this... you're kidding right? So now Ball has put forward his plan. He gave Ed Martin an "offer he couldn't refuse": leave or be fired. He also promised to give Martin his full severance and $160,000 in bonuses - or just under $1.6 million dollars. Designated fall guy in all this? The Nalcor board. Pass the resolution to fire him without cause so he can get his bonus and severance, and then resign yourself. No loose ends. Nice and tidy for Marshall to come in. Emera is out, Fortis is in. Not surprisingly, just days after Marshall was named as President of Nalcor he returned to his home in Belize with a number of senior officials of Fortis who stayed with him at his house for a week. Then came the nuke from David Vardy's access to information request that saw Ed Martin's employment contract released - which in itself is bizarre - and "highly suspect". An employment contract is a privileged document. Those kind of documents aren't released ever. Go figure, this time it was. It just so happened to prove Ball was lying. In other words, the ambush of Ball was on.
Despite the roll that Finance and Justice would have to play in these contracts, and severance negotiations, suddenly Cathy Bennett has disappeared from the scene. Ditto Siobhan Coady. Their two Deputy Ministers sit on the newly appointed Board of Nalcor. Both Bennett and Andrew Parsons have a direct ear into the Nalcor transition and on what happened with the severance negotiations, etc. Yet they've two stepped back from the limelight on this affair, just as Coady has. Coady was in the US until May 5 and claimed she knew nothing. Apparently she can't be reached by telephone or email or skype or what have you. Apparently Texas is now the third world without any such services. The lies are palpable, disingenuous, but meant to do one thing - leave Ball on the gallows by himself. Just as the plan before the election promised to do - get rid of him. That doesn't mean Ball didn't lie. It just means he thought everyone had his back in the deal, and found out that they were gunning for his back instead. As Minister Gamble-Walsh said to me two days ago: "Ball will very likely fall, but caucus is united". United for what you may ask? Good question. She never filled in that blank, but given the moves before the election was even called, it could well be said that the caucus is united in knifing their own leader, falling into line with Bennett, Coady, and possibly Antle, and all those business boys and girls sitting in the shadows and watching the game unfold.
As the Russian army found out in Afghanistan, and the US army found in Vietnam, it's easy to get into a war, but hard to get out. In the last 5 years Newfoundland and Labrador has had 5 Premiers or Premier designates fall. Soon to be 6. The place has become a frenzied feeding zone. It's become a guerrilla war here in a sense. The establishment vs. the people. Social media vs main stream media (sometimes holding hands when it suits the backroom boys). In this frenzy, for the lust and race for power and wealth, very few bases have been covered well. Political and business bodies keep piling up everywhere you look. Social media has morphed into the people's voice. The political "establishment" finds itself largely talking to ... well itself. Nobody else is believing or listening. Easy to get in, hard to get out. Welcome to the jungle baby.
Showing posts with label Privitization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Privitization. Show all posts
Saturday, May 28, 2016
Monday, November 4, 2013
The Privatization of CFLCo 2.0
These days, the number of arguments and issues relating to the first step of the Lower Churchill development (the Muskrat Falls dam) are so numerous that it's easy to become lost in the maze for the casual observer. There is the politically mangled agreement between Emera and Nalcor that is starting to resemble the same desperation of the ill-fated Hydro-Quebec renewal clause in the 1969 Power Contract. The issues hear are primarily political, but legally could effect the federal loan guarantee. There is the North Spur controversy which questions the physical integrity of the project, with the certain possibility of a massive concrete blanket worth billions being wrapped around the Spur. There are the environmental issues. There are the five lawsuits which place the loan guarantee expiry date of December 31, 2013 out of reach. There is all of this. But there is one factor that gives this article its title - the poison pill: the Reversion Act decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1984.
I touched on this issue in a previous article regarding the recent Hydro-Quebec court challenge of Nalcor's decision to take more power than it's entitled to under the Power Contract. That issue is currently before the Court. That article has had a huge readership internationally, and nationally, including: every major Canadian bank; the largest US investment firms; multiple governments (including Quebec); and multinational companies from Germany to the US. In other words, it's a big concern, and so it should be to anyone doing any serious due diligence of this project.
Nalcor admitted, in its pre-filed evidence before the Public Utilities Board (PUB) in 2009, that a water management agreement was necessary in order for the Lower Churchill project to be viable (both proposed dams: Muskrat Falls and Gull Island). That part is true, and frankly just common sense. Without it, the projected cost of power delivered to the Island from Labrador would go from 25 cents a kilowatt hour (kwh), already the most expensive power in the world, to a staggering 75 cents a kwh (at a minimum). This of course would immediately put the finances, and therefore ability to survive, of all but the wealthy in the province. So, the water management agreement is the life blood of the Lower Churchill project, without which it dies.
Premier Dunderdale has, in the last two months, stated several times that the position of the government, and Nalcor (or is that the other way around), is that when the Power Contract renews in 2016 our province does not owe Hydro-Quebec the same obligations as the first term of the contract.
Their legal position is that after 2016, Hydro-Quebec is subject to an "energy allowance", which means that it has only a block of power each month, and the rest is available for Nalcor to take at the same cost Hydro-Quebec would have gotten for it (by 2016 that will be an incredibly cheap $0.0020 per kwh). Nalcor estimates, according to Vice-President Gilbert Bennett, that extra energy would be about 1500 MW per year, which would generate about $600 million in profit for Nalcor once sold. That is where any and all the "revenue" is in the Muskrat Falls dam project. That's the plan anyway.
Here's the killer:
The Supreme Court of Canada, 1984, decision on the Reversion Act, as proposed by the province's government of the day:
"the company (CFLCo) signed a contract (the Power Contract) with Hydro-Quebec whereby it agreed to supply and Hydro-Quebec agreed to purchase virtually all of the hydro-electric power produced at Churchill Falls for 65 years."
The Court then goes on to qualify what Hydro-Quebec is not entitled to:
"It is against this background that the Power Contract between CFLCo and Hydro-Quebec was signed on May 15, 1969. It is a lengthy and detailed document. Under the contract CFLCo agreed to supply and Hydro-Quebec agreed to purchase virtually all of the power produced at Churchill Falls for a term of forty years, which was renewable at the option of Hydro-Quebec for a further term of twenty-five years. The price to be paid for the electricity was to be based on the final capital cost of the project. Provision was made for CFLCo to retain a fixed amount of power for use within Labrador by its subsidiary Twin Falls Power Corporation. In addition CFLCo could recall on three years’ minimum notice up to 300 megawatts (MW) to meet the needs of the Province of Newfoundland."
The Supreme Court of Canada, the highest Court of the land, unanimously agreed that Hydro-Quebec had the right to all the power produced at the Upper Churchill until 2041 (65 years) except 300 MW of recall the province could request, and the 225 MW for Twinco. Given that the issue was decided in 1984, the question remains: How can Danny Williams as Premier, and then Kathy Dunderdale as his successor, possibly think our province can take any of the power from the Upper Churchill dam other than the 525 MW already committed to by recall and Twinco?
It is a hard question to ignore, yet our media in the province has done just that - completely ignored it. The provincial CBC has been particularly negligent given it's role as a public broadcaster paid for by the public. While the CBC as a corporation is a strong advocate, normally, of the public interest, CBC Newfoundland and Labrador seems bedeviled by personality and spin. But I digress. Bottom line is, other than the radio shows, this fundamental issue is being completely ignored, and the media is not holding these politicians, and Nalcor, to account on our behalf.
I touched on this issue in a previous article regarding the recent Hydro-Quebec court challenge of Nalcor's decision to take more power than it's entitled to under the Power Contract. That issue is currently before the Court. That article has had a huge readership internationally, and nationally, including: every major Canadian bank; the largest US investment firms; multiple governments (including Quebec); and multinational companies from Germany to the US. In other words, it's a big concern, and so it should be to anyone doing any serious due diligence of this project.
Nalcor admitted, in its pre-filed evidence before the Public Utilities Board (PUB) in 2009, that a water management agreement was necessary in order for the Lower Churchill project to be viable (both proposed dams: Muskrat Falls and Gull Island). That part is true, and frankly just common sense. Without it, the projected cost of power delivered to the Island from Labrador would go from 25 cents a kilowatt hour (kwh), already the most expensive power in the world, to a staggering 75 cents a kwh (at a minimum). This of course would immediately put the finances, and therefore ability to survive, of all but the wealthy in the province. So, the water management agreement is the life blood of the Lower Churchill project, without which it dies.
Premier Dunderdale has, in the last two months, stated several times that the position of the government, and Nalcor (or is that the other way around), is that when the Power Contract renews in 2016 our province does not owe Hydro-Quebec the same obligations as the first term of the contract.
Their legal position is that after 2016, Hydro-Quebec is subject to an "energy allowance", which means that it has only a block of power each month, and the rest is available for Nalcor to take at the same cost Hydro-Quebec would have gotten for it (by 2016 that will be an incredibly cheap $0.0020 per kwh). Nalcor estimates, according to Vice-President Gilbert Bennett, that extra energy would be about 1500 MW per year, which would generate about $600 million in profit for Nalcor once sold. That is where any and all the "revenue" is in the Muskrat Falls dam project. That's the plan anyway.
Here's the killer:
The Supreme Court of Canada, 1984, decision on the Reversion Act, as proposed by the province's government of the day:
"the company (CFLCo) signed a contract (the Power Contract) with Hydro-Quebec whereby it agreed to supply and Hydro-Quebec agreed to purchase virtually all of the hydro-electric power produced at Churchill Falls for 65 years."
The Court then goes on to qualify what Hydro-Quebec is not entitled to:
"It is against this background that the Power Contract between CFLCo and Hydro-Quebec was signed on May 15, 1969. It is a lengthy and detailed document. Under the contract CFLCo agreed to supply and Hydro-Quebec agreed to purchase virtually all of the power produced at Churchill Falls for a term of forty years, which was renewable at the option of Hydro-Quebec for a further term of twenty-five years. The price to be paid for the electricity was to be based on the final capital cost of the project. Provision was made for CFLCo to retain a fixed amount of power for use within Labrador by its subsidiary Twin Falls Power Corporation. In addition CFLCo could recall on three years’ minimum notice up to 300 megawatts (MW) to meet the needs of the Province of Newfoundland."
The Supreme Court of Canada, the highest Court of the land, unanimously agreed that Hydro-Quebec had the right to all the power produced at the Upper Churchill until 2041 (65 years) except 300 MW of recall the province could request, and the 225 MW for Twinco. Given that the issue was decided in 1984, the question remains: How can Danny Williams as Premier, and then Kathy Dunderdale as his successor, possibly think our province can take any of the power from the Upper Churchill dam other than the 525 MW already committed to by recall and Twinco?
It is a hard question to ignore, yet our media in the province has done just that - completely ignored it. The provincial CBC has been particularly negligent given it's role as a public broadcaster paid for by the public. While the CBC as a corporation is a strong advocate, normally, of the public interest, CBC Newfoundland and Labrador seems bedeviled by personality and spin. But I digress. Bottom line is, other than the radio shows, this fundamental issue is being completely ignored, and the media is not holding these politicians, and Nalcor, to account on our behalf.
The Williams/Dunderdale approach does beg one very specific question: Is the intent of the Lower Churchill project to undermine the province, and specifically CFLCo, with the end result being a deliberate bankruptcy of CFLCo, resulting in it's privatization and/or sale? I ask this question for several reasons. First off, it's not as if privatization of CFLCo is something new. Former Premier Clyde Wells, along with his Chief of Staff Ed Hollett (now a blogger writing under "Sir Robert Bond Papers"), attempted to privatize CFLCo in the 1990's, but had to back off after huge public opposition - then headed by Sue Kelland-Dwyer (now blogging under "Sue's Blog").
This approach would be almost too far fetched to consider if it weren't for a few facts. One is Danny Williams. He is a lawyer. It's quite obvious to even the untrained eye that this water management agreement is not constitutional - let alone a lawyer of some experience. Secondly, the province has an entire legal department, just in case William's dropped the ball. What remains far fetched is that somehow between them the obvious flaws of their deal were not apparent.
There is also the 1998 Shareholder's Agreement, drawn up by then Liberal Premier Brian Tobin and Dean MacDonald, which essentially gave Hydro-Quebec a veto over CFLCo's business operations, and equal rights to any shares of CFLCo if/when they become available.
Then there is this little tidbit from the 2008 New Dawn Agreement, signed with the Innu of Labrador, to authorize building the dam. In particular, an entire section of which details how a sale of CFLCo shares would affect the Innu Nation's income:
" 2. (c) In the event that the parent company of CFLCo (Nalcor) sells any of its common shares, the Innu Nation shall be entitled to receive three percent (3%) of the proceeds received from the sale of its common shares. If a sale takes place prior to September 1, 2041, the total proceeds shall be reduced by the present value of the expected free cash flow from the common dividends from the date of sale up to and including August 31, 2041.
(d) If CFLCo issues a new class of shares with the purpose of diluting the value of the dividends on common shares referred to in section 2(b), above, the Innu Nation's share of common dividends is to be calculated as if the new class of shares had not been issued."
It begs the question: What exactly did the Williams' government, and its then Minister of Natural Resources, and now Premier, Dunderdale, have in mind with these provisions. They are clearly forward looking and anticipate a sale of CFLCo shares. Is this in anticipation that CFLCo may have to be sold? Is it in anticipation of the bankruptcy of CFLCo as detailed in the Department of Natural Resources Report of 2012? These are questions right now without answers. You either have to believe Williams and company were so foolish as to stumble into catastrophe, or you have to think it was planned to be so. One friend of Danny Williams said to me once: "People like you and I plan on where we are going to go for lunch today. Williams plans where he will be having lunch two years from now." If that's the case, it leans to the answer being a deliberate, planned catastrophe. If it's planned then there has to be a reason.
Sunday, June 19, 2011
Is Nalcor the new New Brunswick Power?
Is Nalcor the new New Brunswick power? That question has been weighing heavily on my mind lately. Take for instance my recent post Muskrat Math. That math results in a $930 million operating loss a year on the Lower Churchill project. However, that sum is really too generous as it doesn't take into account the cost overruns of the subsea cable, and it doesn't take into account the guaranteed 8.3% return promised to Nalcor, Emera, and Fortis. More importantly, it doesn't take into account the fact that Nalcor can only transmit roughly 30% of the Lower Churchill's production to Nova Scotia for sale to the US or the maritime provinces. Given that stark reality, that $930 million a year loss has to be increased by more than double as it was based on selling all the power. That is a staggering $2 billion loss per year. It defies imagination in one way, but the numbers speak for themselves.
Consider that Ed Martin, CEO of Nalcor apparently told Randy Simms of VOCM radio that the province's energy consumption has been increasing each year. Unfortunately for Mr. Martin, Nalcor's own consumption graphs show a radical decline in consumption since 2003. Power consumption in the province is on the decline. One example of this: In 2000 the Holyrood facility went through roughly 2.5 million barrels of fuel per year; and in 2010 that number decreased to 1.3 million barrels. The point is that what Nalcor and the provincial government are saying on one hand does not match the evidence that in many cases is readily available from their own documents.
Then consider that the government revealed it would allow the Public Utilities Board to investigate the financial worthiness of the Lower Churchill project, but it won't have to report its findings until the 30th of December, 2011. That is two months after the provincial election and one month after the deadline to ink a final agreement with Emera. Draw your own conclusions on that one. Based on the staggering financial lunacy of this agreement there are essentially three realistic reasons why this project has been put forward.
The first could be rooted in some sort of misguided nationalism. A beating of the chest by then Premier Danny Williams at Quebec, and the rest of the country. A "damn the torpedoes we're going in" type of approach. Mr. Williams took down the flag to protest federal actions. His cabinet is almost completely anti-Canadian (according to several members of his government I spoke to -including a Minister). He has a bone to pick with Hydro Quebec over the Upper Churchill, and on that we can both agree. It is also good local politics to throw wood on the fire of anti-Quebec feelings in the province. Yet he is and remains a businessman. He was a businessman before he became a politician, and has returned to business now that he has retired from politics. This deal makes no positive business sense. So this option is out, other than its use as a tool to promote the deal.
The second could be rooted in the idea that the Lower Churchill project, and more specifically the subsea cable to Nova Scotia, would cause Hydro Quebec to panic over potential competition in the US market and come to favourable terms with Nalcor. The problem with that approach is the deal clearly hurts us, and does not effect Hydro Quebec in the least. In fact, Hydro Quebec would be smart to allow, even promote the idea. The resulting economic costs of the deal with leave Nalcor and the province in a situation very similar to that of New Brunswick Power. That is where things get interesting.
Consider that New Brunswick has: an aging population, low birth rate, an evenly split rural and urban population; and energy exports that account for two thirds of its total exports. If that sounds familiar it's because it mirrors the scenario in Newfoundland and Labrador. We all know that Hydro Quebec tried a friendly takeover of New Brunswick Power (NBP) a short time ago. NBP was, and remains, a power company in distress. It has a debt of $4.8 billion dollars. Much of that debt is associated with excess capacity in its electrical generation. NBP generated 4678 mw of electricity in 2010. Nalcor generated 1517 mw in 2010. The addition of Muskrat Falls would add another 865 mw a year for a total generation of 2382 mw, or half the capabilities of NBP. If the Lower Churchill goes ahead Nalcor's debt will be in the $6-7 billion dollar range. NBP has too much capacity to create power and not enough profitable markets to sell it to in order to recoup its debt. The annual cost of operations is therefore driving the company into the ground, and taking down the provincial treasury with it. With our higher debt and 50% less in capacity we have no chance of doing as well as NBP currently is.
The New Brunswick government tried to get out of the never ending cash spiral by selling NBP to Hydro Quebec. The biggest selling feature was that Hydro Quebec would take over the debt, which in turn would free the people of New Brunswick from certain economic collapse. The deal didn't go through. Danny Williams used option one above to appeal to people there. He made Hydro Quebec the bogey man, and maybe they are. The business reality is that it was the New Brunswick government that created their economic nightmare and not Quebec. Quebec tried to capitalize on it - that's business. The important lesson is that the New Brunswick government did it to itself, and its people.
The big question is why are we about to do it to ourselves? New Brunswick has a population 30% larger than Newfoundland and Labrador. They are capable of a larger tax load. They already have more power than they can sell. What they can sell can only be sold at a loss .Why would we do the same to ourselves?
Is the third option a deliberate attempt to place Nalcor in a bankrupt situation like NBP? What would be the point of that? Other than the potential to reduce our "have" status so we pay less or nothing toward equalization to the federal government, a massive NBP-like debt would leave Nalcor open to sale or privatization.
Among Nalcor's assets of course is control over the Upper Churchill - the real jewel in the crown. Is the effect of all these poor business decisions, if not the goal, to render Nalcor a financial death blow that would require outside intervention? Say perhaps even leave the corporation open to a potential take over by the likes of Hydro Quebec? After all, if not for Williams intervention at the time, NBP would be a subsidiary of Hydro Quebec today. NBP will have to be sold down the road in any case as its debt, and capacity issues doom it to that fate. Taxpayers in New Brunswick will only suffer for so long to spite Quebec, and then they will bend under tax burdens. It will be a "we have no choice" kind of scenario.
The kind of scenario Ms Dunderdale and the PC Party of Newfoundland and Labrador are placing us in.
Consider that Ed Martin, CEO of Nalcor apparently told Randy Simms of VOCM radio that the province's energy consumption has been increasing each year. Unfortunately for Mr. Martin, Nalcor's own consumption graphs show a radical decline in consumption since 2003. Power consumption in the province is on the decline. One example of this: In 2000 the Holyrood facility went through roughly 2.5 million barrels of fuel per year; and in 2010 that number decreased to 1.3 million barrels. The point is that what Nalcor and the provincial government are saying on one hand does not match the evidence that in many cases is readily available from their own documents.
Then consider that the government revealed it would allow the Public Utilities Board to investigate the financial worthiness of the Lower Churchill project, but it won't have to report its findings until the 30th of December, 2011. That is two months after the provincial election and one month after the deadline to ink a final agreement with Emera. Draw your own conclusions on that one. Based on the staggering financial lunacy of this agreement there are essentially three realistic reasons why this project has been put forward.
The first could be rooted in some sort of misguided nationalism. A beating of the chest by then Premier Danny Williams at Quebec, and the rest of the country. A "damn the torpedoes we're going in" type of approach. Mr. Williams took down the flag to protest federal actions. His cabinet is almost completely anti-Canadian (according to several members of his government I spoke to -including a Minister). He has a bone to pick with Hydro Quebec over the Upper Churchill, and on that we can both agree. It is also good local politics to throw wood on the fire of anti-Quebec feelings in the province. Yet he is and remains a businessman. He was a businessman before he became a politician, and has returned to business now that he has retired from politics. This deal makes no positive business sense. So this option is out, other than its use as a tool to promote the deal.
The second could be rooted in the idea that the Lower Churchill project, and more specifically the subsea cable to Nova Scotia, would cause Hydro Quebec to panic over potential competition in the US market and come to favourable terms with Nalcor. The problem with that approach is the deal clearly hurts us, and does not effect Hydro Quebec in the least. In fact, Hydro Quebec would be smart to allow, even promote the idea. The resulting economic costs of the deal with leave Nalcor and the province in a situation very similar to that of New Brunswick Power. That is where things get interesting.
Consider that New Brunswick has: an aging population, low birth rate, an evenly split rural and urban population; and energy exports that account for two thirds of its total exports. If that sounds familiar it's because it mirrors the scenario in Newfoundland and Labrador. We all know that Hydro Quebec tried a friendly takeover of New Brunswick Power (NBP) a short time ago. NBP was, and remains, a power company in distress. It has a debt of $4.8 billion dollars. Much of that debt is associated with excess capacity in its electrical generation. NBP generated 4678 mw of electricity in 2010. Nalcor generated 1517 mw in 2010. The addition of Muskrat Falls would add another 865 mw a year for a total generation of 2382 mw, or half the capabilities of NBP. If the Lower Churchill goes ahead Nalcor's debt will be in the $6-7 billion dollar range. NBP has too much capacity to create power and not enough profitable markets to sell it to in order to recoup its debt. The annual cost of operations is therefore driving the company into the ground, and taking down the provincial treasury with it. With our higher debt and 50% less in capacity we have no chance of doing as well as NBP currently is.
The New Brunswick government tried to get out of the never ending cash spiral by selling NBP to Hydro Quebec. The biggest selling feature was that Hydro Quebec would take over the debt, which in turn would free the people of New Brunswick from certain economic collapse. The deal didn't go through. Danny Williams used option one above to appeal to people there. He made Hydro Quebec the bogey man, and maybe they are. The business reality is that it was the New Brunswick government that created their economic nightmare and not Quebec. Quebec tried to capitalize on it - that's business. The important lesson is that the New Brunswick government did it to itself, and its people.
The big question is why are we about to do it to ourselves? New Brunswick has a population 30% larger than Newfoundland and Labrador. They are capable of a larger tax load. They already have more power than they can sell. What they can sell can only be sold at a loss .Why would we do the same to ourselves?
Is the third option a deliberate attempt to place Nalcor in a bankrupt situation like NBP? What would be the point of that? Other than the potential to reduce our "have" status so we pay less or nothing toward equalization to the federal government, a massive NBP-like debt would leave Nalcor open to sale or privatization.
Among Nalcor's assets of course is control over the Upper Churchill - the real jewel in the crown. Is the effect of all these poor business decisions, if not the goal, to render Nalcor a financial death blow that would require outside intervention? Say perhaps even leave the corporation open to a potential take over by the likes of Hydro Quebec? After all, if not for Williams intervention at the time, NBP would be a subsidiary of Hydro Quebec today. NBP will have to be sold down the road in any case as its debt, and capacity issues doom it to that fate. Taxpayers in New Brunswick will only suffer for so long to spite Quebec, and then they will bend under tax burdens. It will be a "we have no choice" kind of scenario.
The kind of scenario Ms Dunderdale and the PC Party of Newfoundland and Labrador are placing us in.
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