Operation Guillotine - The Coming Russian Counterattack

 

Lessons of war: every war is different, yet the basics remain the same - isolate and destroy. There is a hard way and their is an easier way to defeat your opponent. There is the art of war, and their is the wall of reality. The Ukrainians have shown more creativity and initiative in the art of war - likely through the eyes of their backers. The Russians started the war with a lot of imagination and initiative, but hit the wall of reality that splitting your forces is the best way to have them devoured - the wall of reality. They were forced to recoil, and the Ukrainians simply followed their retreat out of Kherson, Sumy, Kiev, and Kharkov Oblasts. The Ukrainian advance stooped just west of the Oskil River when Russian contraction allowed them to solidify defensive lines. The Ukrainians then made several ill-advised offensives for the flanks of the destroyed city of Bakhmut, which unnecessarily ate man power, resources, and time. They are currently attempting to capture Tokmak as a gateway to the Azoz Sea coast - which is mired in failure. The time may be ripe for a massive Russian offensive to decisively end the war. 

LESSIONS OF WAR

One of the biggest lessons of this war has been flanking major concentrations of enemy troops without sufficient distance between the parties is a recipe for loss. Loss can be in momentum, in troops, in equipment, in morale and in time - all enemies of a successful military campaign. We have witnessed this from both sides in this war. Whether its the endless Russian quagmires of Avdiivka and Marinka, or the Ukrainian quagmires of Bakhmut and Zaporizhia. Limiting    yourself to a flanking that exposes your forces to the maximum range effect of the enemies        artillery support, and mining, guarantees that your efforts will result in stalemate at best. This    has become the reoccurring theme of the Ukrainian War. So lesson one is flanking pincers must bypass major troop concentrations - not engage them. That's Blitzkrieg 101. The strategic aim to cut off supply to the enemy BEFORE engaging them in an attrition battle.

Lesson number two: piecemealing forces is a recipe for disaster. We witnessed the Russians commit this terrible strategy when they invaded Ukraine. It ended up in a loss of: momentum; troops; equipment, morale and time. The Ukrainians were able to survive and rebuild. What has happened since is piecemeal attacks by both sides, with the exceptions of Bakhmut and Mariupol, which have resulted in mass casualties with no significant progress - near stalemate in other words. Wars are not won on offensives conducted by battalion or less groups, yet that is what has been happening along almost all parts of the front by both sides - resulting in nothing but casualties and losses in equipment. 

Lesson three: concentrated, long range attacks against strategically imperative targets are highly effective. The Ukrainians essentially made the Russian positions in Kherson Oblast untenable when they rendered the Kherson bridge unusable. The Russians have been terrible at this - for  some reason. For example there are only two Ukrainian rail bridges crossing the Dnieper River: the Amursky Bridge in Dnipro; and the Petrivskiy Bridge in Kiev. Both those bridges still stand and allow Ukraine to transfer Western arms and ammunition to its forces in the most efficient  way possible, rail, given the size of the country. The hydro dam bridges that dot the Dnieper remain untouched - ditto for the car bridges. This one lesson appears to be completely lost on the Russian leadership, and has been a major strategic mistake harming Russian forces on a daily basis.

Lesson four: minefields stop troops and equipment from moving - Zaporiozhia for example. They can be used in an offensive or defensive posture. They can stop troops from advancing, and they can stop troops from retreating. Essentially, Russian mobile mine-laying units, like the modern ISDM Zemledelive, can be paired with armored formations to fix enemy flanking forces in place while bypassing them to greater depths. In a Blitzkrieg-like offensive, the ability to instantly trap the enemy in strongholds while on the move opens the doors to large advances. It is a combined-arms operation that hasn't been utilized well by the Russians. 

Frankly, the lessons of this war could be covered in a very thick book, and a simple blog can hardly cover it all. The bottom-line is the Russians are about to initiate a very large offensive of their own, and the only question is where and how. 

OPERATION GUILLOTINE

PHASE ONE

Given the lesson the Ukrainians taught the Russians in Kherson, which the Russians should have foreseen, any coming offensive must first sever the artery of supply. Without food, ammunition, and fuel a modern army cannot survive for more than weeks, so cutting supply is the first priority. To that end the Russians must first conduct a massive airstrike on Ukraine's most capable air defences - the German and American AD. Simultaneously, the Russians must destroy the railway bridges over the Dnieper so that Ukraine can no longer supply its forces with mass railway movements - that's two bridges. With major air defences destroyed, Russian strategic bombers focus on destroying Ukrainian artillery regiments in the Sumy/Kharhov regions. 

PHASE TWO

Russian airborne forces conduct mass drops along the river just west of Poltava. Their objective is to secure the river crossing (no bridges needed) for the coming armored and mechanized infantry forces that will surround Poltava and move on to Kremenchuk  and Dnipro. The Russian Army will use two centres for the start of their operation: Kursk and Belgorod. The Kursk group will flank the city of Sumy at a distance, isolating it as it goes with mobile mining, and proceed to the crossing points the airborne have secured. They will then isolate Poltava in the same fashion as Sumy, and proceed to the Dnieper. The second grouping, from Belgorod, will also flank Kharkov at distance, isolating it in the same fashion with mobile mining, then move to the eastern part of Poltava, isolating it, and meeting up with the Kursk grouping at Dnipro. It is critical that the route of the advance is not too narrow, avoids rivers requiring bridges, and is open enough for armored/mechanized warfare. No forests, no rivers, no cities and as few tree lines as possible.

PHASE THREE

Having secured its positions in Phase Two, the Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine will be trapped and without supply. The Ukrainian forces in these areas will have no choice but to surrender. They won't do so immediately, but the plight of the troops and the fury in Kiev will likely force the Ukrainian military/government's hand. A show of successful force in a decisive manner, will likely quiet the war drums beating in places like Poland, etc. However, even if this offensive succeeds, and it does not quiet the warmongers, it will leave Russia in the position of controlling all of Eastern Ukraine, and opens the doorway to Odessa. Time will tell what path the Russian military/government choose, but whatever they choose must incorporate the lessons of this war, otherwise the fingers must be pointed inward.   

Ukrainian and Russian Offensive Options

 It's been just over a year since Russia launched its "Special Military Operation" against Ukraine, and what a year it has been. Many mistakes have been made by both sides, and if NATO had not intervened to supply Ukraine with weapons, and just as importantly money, this war would have been over in three months at the most. In particular, shoulder fired anti tank weapons paralyzed the Russian advance, which due to the time of year, was reduced to funneling along road ways which became killing zones. The Russians, having lost the initiative of a quick lightening attack, became overstretched and in a vulnerable position. The Ukrainians took advantage of that by launching their offensive in Lugansk, Kharkov and Kherson oblasts. The Russians then had no choice but to with drawl to a defensive posture that its army could defend. That sums up the first year of the war more or less. 

The big question is what are the next battlefield moves. Ukraine is facing some difficult choices in this regard. Although much has been made by Ukrainian and Western propaganda of the successful Ukrainian "counter offensive" (which is the political term for counter-attack") in driving Russian troops back, this is a bit of a stretch. The truth is when Russia failed to capture Mykolaiv, and thereby open the door to Odessa, the only real defensive position they could take was the city of Kherson and the Dnieper River. American exports of Hymars rocket systems to Ukraine, which constantly damaged Russian crossings of the Dnieper, forced Russia to abandon the city of Kherson and establish defensive lines on the opposite side of the Dnieper. Up until that time, Ukrainian troops were suffering defeat after defeat in the fields north of Kherson, so it wasn't Ukrainian offensive tactics that one the day, but rather strategic tactics.

In Kharkov/ Lugansk oblasts it was a similar story. It was not so much a feat of arms that dislodged the Russians from this area - it was overrun because Russian forces were very over stretched and had to withdraw to defensible lines. That brings us to today. The Russian Army is no longer in a position of being overstretched. It has had time to reinforce defensive lines along the front, and increase the size of its forces engaged in the conflict by 300,000 troops (not including Wagner units). Importantly, the Russians have hurriedly upgraded their acquisition and use of drones. This leaves Ukraine with the stark choice of where to conduct an offensive (the much touted "spring counter offensive") as demanded by their Western allies. 

The most talked about, and perhaps obvious choice is an attack along the southern front from Zaporizhzhia, which would aim to capture Melitopol and Mariupol - effectively ending the Russian land route to Crimea. However, that option is also obvious to the Russians, and the area has been heavily fortified and reinforced. The Russians also have the advantage of almost immediate air and naval support from Crimea and area and Rostov-On-Don. While the Ukrainians may try this in an act to appease their backers, should they use massive resources to do so, and lose, their war could be over. Therefore, from a Ukrainian perspective, a large southern assault should be out of the question. Ditto for attacking Crimea in force. That leaves the Donetsk city front, the Bakmut front, or the Russian front as options. 

Both Donetsk and Bakmut fronts are fortified areas that would chew up Ukrainian troops. While a significant attack in Bakhmut, when the ground is dry, may cause the Russians to withdraw, the Ukrainians would be faced with the Severodonetsk area. Built up area after built up area, mostly in ruins. As World War Two showed, cities full of rubble make the job of defence much more easy for the defenders. That leaves the last option - the Russian front.

In the last year Ukraine has shown two traits: embarrass Russia; and try to provoke a greater war in the region. The ideal way to do that would be an invasion of Russia itself - namely Belgorod. Belgorod is a Russian city very close to the Ukrainian border. Not far away from Belgorod is Kharkov, which remains firmly in Ukrainian hands. The Ukrainians can use Kharkov as a strategic supply point for their troops entering Russia and a battle for Belgorod. Undoubtably the Russian military would see such a buildup in Kharkov with their satellites, but what if they decide it also serves their strategic purposes that Ukraine makes such a move. Given that all the other fronts will cost Ukraine massive casualties and loses of equipment, it makes sense to kill a few birds with one stone. No doubt their allies would say "you can't expect Ukraine to fight on its own soil only when it was invaded by a hostile act..." 

On the other side of the fence, Russian military planners have to decide what their next move is. While the intel on Russian forces dispositions is limited to us, we know they called up 300,000 reservists. About 80,000 of those were current enough in their training to join the conflict immediately. Where the other 200,000 plus are is a bit of a mystery. Many channels are suggesting these troops have been going through thorough training with combat veterans. If that is the case, and they have not yet been committed to the fight, Russia has a powerful force for its own spring offensive. However, I doubt this will be the case. 

Russia, unlike Ukraine, has no pressure from its allies to conduct an offensive en masse. It seems quite content to engage, pin and destroy Ukrainian units - namely in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. It uses mainly conscripts in Bakhmut, and thereby destroys Ukrainian units while leaving its regular army in one piece. This is how the Russians do military strategy and they have in every major war they've been involved in. Fewer people at home complain about losses when they are people who were in prison. The same mentality exists in the West, but is rarely acted on as it is in this case. Russia has also learned, you would think, that big offenses that stretch your troops too thin bring drastic consequences. 

To avoid these consequences I believe Russia will stand pat until after the Ukrainians commit their troops in an offensive. Once the Russians have defeated the Ukrainian offensive they will go on the counter-attack. That is likely the time that the 200,000 troops in training will be committed, but to where?

Given that the Russian Army is currently trying to take Bakhmut many speculate that Kramatorsk and Slavyansk will be next. However, both cities are heavily fortified and would prove to be worse than Bakhmut in terms of manpower/equipment necessary, time and casualties. It makes more sense that the Russians would head south from Bakhmut, through Kostyantynivka and onto Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is a hub city like Bakhmut, and capturing it would cut off Ukrainian troops entrenched around the city of Donetsk. The Russians are currently fighting in, and have captured most of Marinka. Once Marinka is captured the Russians could move along the road to Kurakove. Once Kurakove is captured the Ukrainian Army in Donetsk city area will be fully surrounded in what the Russians like to call a "boiler". Cut off from resupply, and unable to retreat, the enveloped Ukrainians will have no choice but to surrender. This seems like a logical path for a Russian offensive. 

Whatever the case may be in the coming months, look for the Ukrainian Army to make the first move, and Russia to take the advantage in response. 

Requiem for My Brother

David Robinson (Dave), my big brother.

For most of my life I did not know Dave existed. You see Dave was a war child. My father served in the Canadian Forces during WWII, and he met Dave's Mom there early in the war. My Dad was underaged ( a lot more than they knew) so he had to have his commanding officer's permission to marry Dave's Mom, which was finally granted. Dave was born thereafter. I didn't know about Dave's Mom until after Dad had died, but I did recall the story my Dad used to tell of being in a field with a girl friend when the sky darkened with German bombers flying low over England to strike a target, so low he could see the pilots' faces, and that he was forced to slap the girl as she was hyper-panicked and trying to run. He feared for her life. That was Dave's Mom. She and Dad survived and the rest is history.

Then, in 2004, my sister received a phone call from a British man looking for my mother. It was Dave. After some 59 years he had reached out to connect with the Canadian family he never knew. He was gentle on the phone, kind even, and very concerned about "rocking the boat". The fact that none of us knew he existed was a shock to all, but a pleasant one as well. 

After speaking with Dave it became clear that after the war, his mother came to Montreal with little Dave in hand to start a new life with my Dad. Unfortunately, given my Dad's six years of front line experience during the war, he suffered PTSD, and the marriage crumbled. By 1948, Dave and his Mother were back in the UK, seemingly lost to us.

In 2007, my wife and I went to see Dave in England for the first time. When I met him it haunted me that his eyes were the same as my departed Dad's. It took awhile to get past that. He got out of his wheel chair and gave me the world's biggest bear hug. At 220 lbs then. I was no shrinking violet, but there was no denying the sheer strength my brother possessed. At the same time he openly wept at the joy of meeting his little brother for the first time. In a way, which wasn't aware to me at the time, those two qualities were the pillars of my brother - strength and sensitivity. The third pillar, as I was to find out, was his sense of humor, which we shared. His wife Carol was also a great support for him (and me) during these early days, and those to follow. Sadly, Carol passed away a year before Dave, and just as I thought that surely he wouldn't survive it, he did. Strength.

During the 18 years I had with my brother Dave we had many good times - despite his chronic military injuries (and mine). Dave even managed to travel to Canmore, Alberta for my wedding even though he had to use an electric wheel chair to move about. I discovered he was a big a flirt as me (maybe more). He was the subtle one and I was the not so subtle one. We shared our love for helping others in need - a calling to serve. We enjoyed the same rock music. He enjoyed reading my blogs here. Although we did not always agree on my conclusions, he was supportive of my writing. He talked me through life issues, my dealings with Veterans Affairs over my own injuries, the nightmare that was Newfoundland politics, and even issues with my kids. In other words, he was living up to one of his own sayings: "to share is to care". I see his traits, which are in many ways genetic traits, in his own children and grandchildren. 

Ian, Dave's only son, had a career in the security/police services, and is now a retired, and a writer (the writing gene is in our family). He too suffers from health issues that can be traced to the roots of my father's Newfoundland family. Yet, he too remains strong and determined to meet challenges and beat them - which he continues to do much to his credit.

Carolyn, Dave's only daughter, has been a care giver her whole life - personally and professionally. Carolyn and her husband Spence have two great sons, and Dave was very proud and loved both of them. He cherished Aiden's special qualities and the two of them apparently shared a special sense of humor. Unfortunately, Aiden suffers from a serious physical condition that is also in our Newfoundland family's gene pool. Dave's other grandson Sam was also very special to him. He is very much like Dave, and that can only be good for him in this life. He also has the gift of writing, and the poem he read at Dave's funeral was truly beautiful. 

Despite the tumultuous and sad beginning of Dave's life, he was able to persevere as a truly compassionate husband, father, grandfather, uncle, and yes brother. You could not keep his spirit down. He could not be turned. He gave me the gift of having a brother who was all the things I wished I could be, and therefore aspire to be. Despite being bullied for "not having a father" as a child in the UK school system, he grew up to be a wonderful father. He never became embittered at all. He was my big brother. God bless him.